JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS OF MARITIME TORT ACTIONS: APPLICATION OF
STATE AND FEDERAL REMEDIES
At common law, death terminated all causes of action for
personal injuries, and gave rise to no causes of action for
compensation of the decedent's estate or family. Admiralty,
which adopted the common law, therefore provided neither a
remedy for wrongful death nor for survival of causes of action.
To correct this, there have been a number of Congressional
enactments and judicially created remedies which, however, are
complicated by inconsistencies and vagaries. If death results
from an injury occurring on navigable waters, 2 recovery may be
sought under the Death on the High Seas Act,:3 the Jones Act,'
5
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
state statutes, or foreign law.'
The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, some of the
jurisdictional problems of the Death on the High Seas Act, the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and
the Jones Act will be examined with special emphasis upon the
question of when a state remedy will be applied in death actions
falling under these particular acts. Second, many difficulties in
the application of these enactments will be traced to the
inconsistent recovery and uniformity principles in an attempt to
point out the need for establishing an over-riding policy as to
the applicability of state remedies in connection with these acts.
I.

The Recovery and Unijbrmity Theories

In The Hamnilton,i two ships collided on the high seas;
recovery was sought in admiralty under a Delaware wrongful
I. W. PROSSIER. HANDBOOK OF THMLAW OF TORTS 920 (3d ed. 1964).
2. As used in this paper, high seas means water more than a marine league from the
shore of a state or territory of the United States; territorial waters refers to the waters
beginning at the low water mark and extending seaward three miles, internal waters refers
to bays and inlets which are considered part of the state under the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea aid the Contiguous Zone as well as to inland navigable rivers and
streams.
3. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1964).
4. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 902-50 (1964).
6. Comment, The Application of State Survival Statutes in Maritime Causes. 60
COLU.x. L. REv. 534-35 (1960).
7. 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
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death statute as there was no applicable federal legislation. The
Supreme Court approved the application of the state statute,
holding that under the Saving to Suitors Clause, 8 both state
courts and state legislators had authority to make law where
Congress had not acted, and it rejected the notion that such
application of state law would produce a "lamentable lack of
uniformity" in admiraltyY In essence, this case illustrates the
recovery principle, that is, the theory that in admiralty, recovery
is more important than uniformity; and to provide full
compensation, admiralty will look to state law to provide the
remedy where there is no adequate federal remedy.
In 1917, ten years after the Hamilton decision, the Supreme
Court decided Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen."' A stevedore
engaged in unloading a ship in the navigable waters of New York
was accidently killed. The New York Workmen's Compensation
Commission gave an award to the widow and children. In
reversing, the Court conceded that state legislation could to some
degree modify or affect maritime law, but added:
[N]o such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential
purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law or interjeres with the proper harmony and uniJbrmity of

that law in its international and interstate relations."
Jensen illustrates the uniformity theory, the view that admiralty
courts should rarely and cautiously apply state law because of
the resulting inconsistencies and lack of uniformity.
Many of the present anomalies in admiralty law can be
traced to the two principles previously discussed. The lower
federal courts differ as to when the recovery principle or the
uniformity principle should be applied in determining the
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964) provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the courts
of the States, of:
(I) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which the" are otherwise entitled
(emphasis added).
9. 207 U.S. at 406.
10. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
II. Id. at 216 (emphasis added). The Court did not overrule The Hamilton; it
conceded that states had the right to grant recovery in death cases. Id. Therefore, it
appears Jensen was aimed at restricting and limiting the applicability of state statutes in
death actions, but not at precluding their application.
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applicability of state statutes, and the Supreme Court has given
them little guidance. As a result, the use and non-use of state
remedies in admiralty is producing a greater lack of uniformity
than the Supreme Court in Jensen envisioned, and is thwarting
recovery which the Hamilton Court sought to foster.
A.

The Death on the High Seas Aet.

The Death on the High Seas Act' provides a remedy for
death caused by a wrongful act, neglect, dr default occurring on
the high seas more than a marine league from the shore of any
state, the District of Columbia, or the territories or dependencies
of the United States.13 It is a wrongful death statute allowing the
decedent's representative to sue in admiralty for the benefit of
the decedent's spouse, child, or dependent relative against the
vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable had
death not resulted." Contributory negligence of the decedent is
not a defense, but it will reduce the amount of his recovery
5
proportionally.
A question on which the lower federal courts disagree is
whether this act is meant to provide the exclusive remedy for
deaths occurring more than a marine league from shore, or
whether state statutes can be used for survival of causes of action
or for supplemental damages. The court in Wilson v.
Transocean Airlines" mentions that the Death on the High Seas
Act was enacted to terminate the uncertainty and confusion resulting from extraterritorial application of state wrongful death
statutes. Thus, one could deduce that the remedy was meant to be
exclusive. However, it is suggested in one student comment that
the legislators did not consider the question of whether state
survival statutes could be applied to deaths resulting from
injuries occurring on the high seas and were concerned only with
12. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1964) [hereinafter cited as DHSA].
13. Id. at§ 761.
14. Id.
15. Id. at § 766.
16. 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954) contains an excellent synopsis of the
legislative history. The court in Wilson mentions that there were two theories of
jurisdiction allowing a state to impose liability for a wrongful act on the high seas: 1)
The vessel upon which the wrongful act occurred was contructively a part of the state's
territory: 2) The wrongdoer was a vessel or citizen of the state and subject to its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at 88. With both theories, there was the inherent difficulty of
determining to which state a vessel belonged, for example, its home port, or the residency of its owners. Id.
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establishing an exclusive remedy for wrongful death.17 The Act
itself provides that whenever death occurs more than a marine
league from shore, "the personal representative of the
decedent mar maintain a suit . .. ."" The Fifth Circuit has held
that the legislative history of the enactment indicates that it was
meant to be the exclusive remedy for death more than a marine
league from shore, and therefore, it refused to allow a plaintiff to
file suit based on the Louisiana death statute for supplemental
damages.'1 The district courts of New York, however, reason
that the Death on the High Seas Act preempted only actions for
wrongful death, and the theory of liability based upon survival of
causes of action which the injured person himself had prior to
death is not excluded by the Act. They therefore allow a cause of
action based on the survival statute of the tortfeasor's state?" In
essence, the controversy in the lower federal courts is between the
uniformity and recovery theories of admiralty jurisdiction in
death cases.
The Supreme Court may soon settle the controversy.
Arguments have been heard for the joined cases of Rodrigue v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.2' and Dore v. Link Belt Co. 22 In
Rodrigue, the decedent was killed in an accident on the derrick
of a fixed drilling rig located on the Outer Continental Shelf,
twenty-eight miles south of Louisiana. Petitioner argued that in
addition to bringing a cause of action for pecuniary losses under
the Death on the High Seas Act, she had the right under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act"2 : to sue for supplemental
damages for loss of love, society, affection, and companionship
under the Louisiana Death Statute. 4 The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act provides in part that the laws of the adjacent
17. Comment, supra note 6,at 535.
18. DHSA. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964) (emphasis added).
19. Dore v. Link Belt Co., 391 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968).
20. Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.. 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). See also Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.
N.Y. 1965) in which the court recognized New York's authority to apply its wrongful
death statute to deaths occurring on the high seas by reason of the fact that the statute
incorporated admiralty law.
21. 395 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
granted. 393 U.S. 932 (1968).
22. 391 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. granted. 393 U.S. 932 (1968).
23. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964) [hereinafter cited as OCSLA].
24. Petitioner's Brief at 11-13, Rodrigue and Dore v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. and Link Belt Co., No. 436, 1969 Term (U.S.Sup. Ct.) (argued March 4. 1969).
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state, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with applicable
federal law, attach to the area of the Outer Continental Shelf. 5
The Fifth Circuit rejected this contention by relying on its
decSlion in Dore v. Link Belt.2" The court in Dore pointed out
that there were inconsistencies between the Louisiana death
statute and the Death on the High Seas Act which would thus
preclude the application of the state law. However, the primary
reason asserted for its refusal to apply the state act was because
it believed that since the locale and hazards of the work were
maritime in nature, admiralty and not state statutes should
apply.v In addition, the court determined that Congress intended
to make the Death on the High Seas Act the exclusive remedy
for deaths resulting from torts occurring more than a marine
28
league from shore.
Rodrigue thus presents for determination the question of the
exclusivity of the Death on the High Seas Act, at least as far as
deaths resulting from injuries occurring on the Outer Continental
Shelf are concerned. The following are the most likely solutions.
First, the Supreme Court could deny recovery and determine that
the Death on the High Seas Act is meant to be an exclusive
remedy; this would terminate application of state survival
statutes and death statutes providing for supplemental damages
(love, affection, companionship, society) in death actions arising
on the high seas, but it would achieve uniformity in such cases.
Second, the Court could allow recovery, but base its decision on
the specific provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
providing for application of state laws to the Outer Continental
Shelf to the extent that they are not inconsistent with applicable
federal law: This reasoning would provide limited support for the
recovery principle but would leave in doubt the validity of
applying state remedies to accidents occurring more than a
marine league from shore and not on the Outer Continental
Shelf. Third, the Supreme Court could determine that the Death
on the High Seas Act is exclusive only insofar as pecuniary loss
for death is concerned, but it allows application of state remedies
to provide full compensation for supplemental damages and
25. Id. at § 1333(a)(2). The OCSLA applies to the subsoil and seabed of the Outer
Continental Shelf, including the artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon.
26. 391 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968).
27. Id. at 674.

28. Id. at 675.
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survival of causes of action. The latter reasoning would be
illustrative of the recovery principle.
Although the Supreme Court prefers to decide each case on
the narrow issue presented to it, it is necessary for it to give
some broad policy statements on the issue of the exclusivity of
the Death on the High Seas Act to guide the lower federal courts
and terminate the present inconsistent decisions.
B. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act
The Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation
which was passed in 1927, contains an elaborate scheme
for compensating disabilities or death resulting from injury
occurring on the navigable waters of the United States, including
any drydock, "if recovery . . . through workmens' compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state
law. "3 Generally, an employer, any of whose employees are
engaged in maritime work, in whole or in part on the navigable
waters of the United States, is subject to the Act's compensation
provisions.31 There are certain employees exempted from the
Act's coverage; the most significant are masters or members of a
2
crew or vessel?
Act,29

The Act provides that the liability of the employer shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability to named beneficiaries
unless the employer has failed to secure payment as required? 3 In
that event, the personal representative may elect to sue under the
Longshoremen's Act or to maintain an action at law or
admiralty for damages.
Two major problems in this Act are: 1)is the claim one
which validly might be provided for by state law; 2) if so, does
this preclude the application of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
29. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LHWCA].
30. Id. at § 903 (emphasis added). In 1953, Congress extended the coverage of the
LHWCA by making it applicable to the Outer Continental Shelf. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.

§ 1333(c) (1964).
31. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 902(1) (1964).
32. Id. at § 903(1). Also exempted are persons engaged by a master to load, unload,
or repair a vessel under 18 tons net weight. Id. Officers or employees of the United States
or its agencies, or of any state, foreign government or political subdivision are also not
covered. Id. at § 903(a)(2).

33. Id. at § 905.
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Workers' Compensation Act. In order to appreciate these
problems, it is necessary to examine briefly the cases Southern
Pacific Compan' v. Jensenf: and Western Fuel Co. v. Garcidu
which preceded and influenced the Act.
Prior to the enactment of the Longshoremen's Act, states
began extending their compensation laws to borderline maritime
cases. The Supreme Court terminated this in Southern Pacific
Company v.Jensen .3 Jensen held unconstitutional a New York
workmen's compensation law applying to longshore workers on the
ground that the injury was maritime, employment was maritime,
and the act interfered with the uniformity of the maritime law.:'Twice thereafter Congress tried to circumvent Jensen by
preserving claimant's rights and remedies under states'
workmen's compensation laws, but both attempts were held
unconstitutional."
In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,? the Supreme Court
attempted to mitigate the harshness of Jensen. A stevedore was
killed while working on a vessel anchored in San Francisco Bay.
The Court held that when death results from a maritime tort
committed on the navigable waters within a state whose statutes
provide a cause of action for wrongful death, the admiralty
courts will entertain a libel applying state law. The reasoning
was that the subject matter was inaritimne but local, and it was
felt that in such cases, application of state law would not unduly
interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of admiralty
law. 0
When Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, the provision that the Act would
apply to injuries or death occurring on navigable waters 'if
recovery . . . through workmen's compensation proceedings may
34. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
35.
36.
37.
38.

257 U.S. 233 (1921).
244 U.S. 205 (1917).
Id. at 217.
Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395; held unconstitutional in Knickerbocker

Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634: rendered unconstitutional by State of Washington v. W.C. Dawson and Co., 264 U.S. 219
(1924).
39. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
40. Id. at 242. See also The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) wherein the
Court applied the maritime but local exception to the death of a ship repairman
occurring in the territorial waters of New Jersey.
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not validly be provided by State law" 4 was meant to apply to
workers not covered by the "maritime but local" exception and
2
who were excluded from state coverage by the Jensen rule.1
However, trying to define this category of waterfront workers led
to even greater confusion and lengthy litigation. In recognition of
this fact, in 1942 the Court announced the "twilight zone"
exception in Davis v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of the State
of Washington." Petitioner's husband, a structural steelworker,
was working on a barge in the Snohomish River; he fell or was
knocked from the barge and drowned. His employer was
required to make contributions to the state's workmen's
compensation fund, and a Washington statute provided for
compensation for dependents of workmen engaged in maritime
occupations with no right of recovery under the maritime law.
The Supreme Court recognized that the deceased did come under
the Longshoremen's Act since he was employed on navigable
waters; however, it felt that Congress desired state compensation
provisions to apply whenever possible." This dilemma was
resolved by the Court concluding that in "twilight zone" cases,"
where the decedent is in fact protected under a state
compensation act, presumptive weight will be given to the
constitutionality of state statutes.4" Since in this case the federal
authorities had taken no action and a state statute did apply, the
Court concluded that there was no constitutional obstacle to
petitioner recovering under state law.
Davis is an illustration of the conflict of the uniformity and
recovery principles. In light of the fact that Congress passed the
Longshoremen's Act to compensate those waterfront workers
which Jensen excluded from state compensation acts, the
Supreme Court felt powerless to overrule Jensen. However, the
Court felt constrained to end the hardships of litigation over
which remedy, state or federal, was to be applied in questionable
41. LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
42. Gisevius & Leppert, Maritime Injury Problems: Admiralty v. State Jurisdiction,

12

LOYOLA
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57, 59-62 (1965).

43. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
44. Id. at 252-53.
45. Id. at 256.
46. Id. at 258. The Court also stressed that there were no conflicting administrative
processes; the employer had not made the specified payments required nor controverted
payment prescribed in LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 914(b), (d) (1964). Also, there had bten
no federal administrative hearing. 317 U.S. at 257.
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cases. As a result, a petitioner could seek state remedies if the
case was "maritime but local," or if it was within the "twilight
zone." Ostensibly, the area of applicable state remedies had
expanded, but the problem of proving when they applied was still
as ill-defined as it previously had been.
Since state law could validly be applied in "maritime but
local" and "twilight zone" cases, the problem arose as to
whether the Longshoremen's Act was excluded from application
in these areas. In Calbreck v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 7 decided
in 1962, the Court concluded that it was not. An employee
injured while working on construction of a new vessel sought
compensation under the Longshoremen's Act although he could
have recovered under an applicable state statute. The Court
repudiated the interpretation of Congressional intent which Davis
presented" by stating that the legislative history of the act
precludes the theory that Congress intended to exempt injuries
occurring on navigable waters from the coverage of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act if state
law also provided compensation.4 9 In denying that "twilight
zone" cases were exclusively within the states' jurisdiction, the
Court suggested that both state and federal remedies were
applicable:
Our conclusion is that Congress invoked its Constitutional
power so as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained
by employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular
injury might also have been within the Constitutional reach of
a state's workmen's compensation law.D
The qualifying phrase, "if recovery through workmen's
compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state
law," is now held to be no restriction upon the application of the
Longshoremens' and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. Yet,
47. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
48. 317 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1942). The Court states the following:
March 4, 1927, came the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act . . . . Here again, however, Congress made clear its
purpose to permit state compensation protection whenever possible by
making the federal law applicable only 'if recovery for the disability or death
through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided
by state law.'

Id.
49. 370 U.S. at 130-31.
50. Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
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the question remains: What does it mean? Since Jensen, Garcia,
and Davis have not been expressly overruled, the following
appears to be the state of the law. The injured person has an

election to sue under a state's workmen's compensation law or
the Longshoremen's Act if he is a harbor worker or

longshoreman injured on the navigable waters of a state. The
state can exercise jurisdiction if he is within the somewhat

weakened "maritime but local" exception or if he can prove that
he is within the category of persons in the "twilight zone."
However, despite the fact that state compensation acts cover

him, he can sue in admiralty under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act.

In the last forty years, the Court has tried to fill the void
between state and federal compensation law applicable to
waterfront workers injured on navigable waters: Its solution has

been to create an overlap which is especially harsh on the
employer. If his employees appear subject to the "twilight zone"

exception, an employer may now find it necessary to contribute
not only to the state's workmen's compensation fund, but also to
the fund required under the Longshoremen's Act. If not, he may

be subject to a suit at law for damages, fine or imprisonment5
It should be noted that the purported exclusivity

of

employer's liability, provided for under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, has been weakened in
other areas also. The Longshoremen's Act expressly excludes

from its coverage masters or members of a crew5 2 as they are
governed by the Jones Act

3

However, as has been pointed out in

51. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 938(a) (1964). This was a determining factor in the
Davis case where the Court observed:
The employer's contribution to the state insurance fund may therefore
wholly fail to protect him against the liability for which it was specifically
planned. If this very case is affirmed, for example, the employer will not only
lose the benefit of the state insurance to which he has been compelled to
contribute and by which he has thought himself secured against loss for
accidents to his employees; he must also, by virtue of the conclusion the
employee was subject to the federal act at the time of the accident, become
liable for substantial additional payments. He will also be subject to fine and
imprisonment for the misdemeanor of having failed, as is apparently the
case, to secure payment for the employee under the act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 938,
932.
317 U.S. at 255.
52. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)(1) (1964).
53. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
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a student note,'" because of the federal courts' liberal
interpretation of the word seamen 55 it is not uncommon for
maritime workers to receive benefits under the Longshoremen's
Act and thereafter proceed as a seaman under the Jones Act.
Also, an employer who has full possession and control of a
vessel (as in the case of a bareboat charterer) may be liable not
only as an employer under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act, but also for breach of the warranty
6
of seaworthiness.
C.

The Jones Act

The Jones Act 57 provides that in the case of injury or death
of a seaman, suit may be brought for damages under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act.' This latter Act provides a'cause of
action against the employer for injuries or death resulting from
negligence of officers, agents or employees, or the negligent
defect or insufficiency of equipment."' In the case of death, a suit
for wrongful death based on negligence may be brought for the
benefit of specified survivors;6" any cause of action for negligence
which the decedent may have had prior to his death survives to the
same group.' 1 Hence, pain and suffering which the decedent niav
2
have suffered prior to his death is compensable."
Contributory negligence is not a bar under the Jones Act
although the amount of damages is reduced proportionally.' The
Act also eliminates the defense of assumption of risk if the
injuries resulted, in whole or in part, from the negligence of an
officer, agent, or employee, or from the violation of a safety
statute.64
To be compensable under the Jones Act, the injury need not
have occurred on navigable waters as it must under the
54. Comment, Exclusivity of Liability Under the United States' Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act, 13 LOYOLA L. RIv. 119, 120 (1966-67).
55. See material accompanying note 68 injra.
56. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), Jackson v. Lykes Bros., 386 U.S. 731
(1967). See generally text accompanying notes 71-73 in ra.
57. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
58. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FELA].
59. Id. at § 51.
60. Id.
61. Id. at § 59.
62. Id. See e.g., Cleveland Tankers v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1948).
63. FELA. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
64. id. at § 54.
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Longshoremen's Act. The Supreme Court stated in O'Connell v.
Great Lakes Co."5 that
the admiralty jurisdiction over the suit depends not on the
place where the injury is inflicted but on the nature of the
service and its relationship to the operation of the vessel
plying in navigable waters."
As previously indicated, the concept of what constitutes a
seaman is liberally construed by the courts. Generally, the
standard is whether the injured or deceased was doing the type of
work traditionally done by seamen 7 and this is often a question
of fact for the jury." There are advantages to bringing suit under
the Jones Act rather than under the Longshoremen's Act. The
right to trial by jury is preserved in the Jones Act," and the
amount of compensation is not subject to a statutory schedule as
it is under the Longshoremen's Act.7 11
Since recovery under the Act is limited to negligence cases,
the most frequent use of state death statutes has been in trying to
bring or preserve a cause of action for death based on the theory
of the warranty of seaworthiness. At common law, a seaman had
the right to sue for injuries which resulted from the
unseaworthiness of the vessel.7 ' This was not a cause of action
predicated upon negligence, but rather imposed liability without
fault upon the owner of a vessel which was not reasonably fit to
do the work at hand.72 The Supreme Court has held that the
duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is independent of the duty under
the Jones Act to exercise reasonable care.73 Thus, for personal
65. 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
66. Id. at 42-43.
67. Skibinski v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 360 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1966).
68. Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray. 361 F.2d 432, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1966). See e.g..
Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266 -.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959) (held jury question whether or
not roughneck working on drilling platform resting on Gulf of Mexico was a seaman).
69. Jones Act. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
70. LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 907-09 (1964).
71. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 543-50 (1960) for the
historical background of this type of suit.
72. Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185, 191 (1964). The court states the following:
The subsidiary questions leading to the ultimate conclusion of
seaworthiness are therefore: what is the vessel to do? What are the hazards,
the perils, the forces likely to be incurred? Is the vessel or. the particular
fitting under scrutiny sufficient to withstand those anticipated force? If the
answer is in the affirmative. the vessel (or the fitting) is seaworthy.
73. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960).
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injuries, the seaman can sue under two theories of recovery:
negligence based on the Jones Act and the common law warranty
of seaworthiness.
Since there was no recovery for death at common law, a
death suit predicated upon unseaworthiness could not be brought.
If the death occurred within the territorial waters of the state,
the question which arose was whether the states' survival and
wrongful death statutes could be used to give to the heirs the
right to bring suit for the death of a seaman based on
unseaworthiness of the vessel. In Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp.,7 the administratrix sued for the death of a seaman which
occurred while the ship was docked in Ohio. She sued under the
following theories: (1) for wrongful death by negligence under the
Jones Act; (2) for death caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel
based on Ohio's wrongful death statute; (3) for pain and
suffering due to negligence under the Jones Act; (4) for pain and
suffering due to unseaworthiness based on Ohio's survival
statute.
7 the Court held
In a prior case, Lindgren v. United States,.
that a Virginia wrongful death statute could not be applied to a
case falling within the Jones Act. The Supreme Court in
Gillespie approved this decision, and said that in an action for
death of a seaman killed in the course of his employment,
Congress had intended to exclude the application of state
wrongful death statutes in order to provide a uniform remedy.
Therefore, there could be no recovery for wrongful death caused
70
by unseaworthiness by the application of a state statute.
However, the Court said that a state's survival statute could be
used to preserve the cause of action for pain and suffering based
upon the injuries resulting from the unseaworthiness of the
vessel:

And we may assume, as we have in the past, that after death
of an injured person a state survival statute can preserve the
cause of action for unseaworthiness which would not survive
under the general maritime law 7
In Gillespie, the Court is straddling the fence between the
74. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
75. 281 U.S. 38 (1929).
76. 379 U.S. at 154-55.
77. Id. at 157 (footnotes omitted).
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uniformity and recovery principles. It did not believe that it
should overrule Lindgren, which is based upon the uniformity
principle, 78 so the Court narrowly construed it as only precluding
the application of state wrongful death statutes and not state
survival statutes. It seems incongruous that Congress would have
desired that the remedy which it provided for death under the
Jones Act was to be exclusive whereas the remedy established for
the survival of causes of action was not to be. If the
Congressional goal was to provide uniformity by covering the
entire field of liability, as Lindgren states,79 then Congress did not
intend to have the uniformity broken by application of state
survival statutes to preserve the unseaworthiness cause of action.
If, on the other hand, Congress merely intended to assure that
seamen had some cause of action when injuries or death resulted
during the course of employment, then surely both a state's
wrongful death and survival statutes should be applied to provide
the alternative remedy for suits based upon unseaworthiness.
If the death of a seaman occurs more than a marine league
from shore, the question also arises as to whether the Death on
the High Seas Act can be used as the basis for a suit for
wrongful death based on unseaworthiness. The Lindgren Court
left that question open, as it was concerned only with the
application of a state's wrongful death statute," and predictably,
the lower federal courts have taken advantage of that fact.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided the question, it
is generally agreed among the lower federal courts that the personal
representative of a seaman may pursue a remedy for wrongful
death occurring more than a marine league from shore either
under the Jones Act or under the Death on the High Seas Act.8 '
The reasoning is that the Death on the High Seas Act refers to
the death of a person on the high seas, and there is no indication
in the legislative history of the Jones Act that Congress intended
that Act to supersede the Death on the High Seas Act with respect
78. 281 U.S. 38, 44 (1929). The Lindgren Court makes the folldwing comment:
It is plain that the Merchant Marine Act is one of general application
intended to bring about the uniformity in the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction by the Constitution, and necessarily supersedes the death statutes
of the several states.
79. 281 U.S. at 45-46.

80. Id. at 48.
81. See, e.g., Doyle v. Albatross Tanker Corp., 367 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1966) and
cases cited therein.
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to authorizing death actions.12 Given the fact that several district
courts allow the state survival statute to apply to deaths on the
high seas" the cause of action for pain and suffering based on
unseaworthiness is also often preserved. The result is the
anomalous rule that the decedent seaman's representative is
precluded from suing for death under the doctrine of
unseaworthiness only if the death occurs in the territorial or
inland waters of a state, the areas in which seabound traffic must
of necessity traverse. The state's survival statute can be applied
to preserve a cause of action for unseaworthiness if the tort
occurs in the navigable or territorial waters of a state or even, in
many districts, on the high seas. The Death on the High Seas
Act can be used to bring suit for death caused by
unseaworthiness.
II.

Conclusion

Many of the difficulties in applying state remedies to
injuries covered by the Death on the High Seas Act, the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and
the Jones Act can be traced to a failure by the courts and
Congress to decide whether the uniformity or recovery principles
govern the jurisdictional scope of these Acts.
Congress must decide which principle it desires to govern
when passing acts giving admiralty causes of action to torts
occurring on navigable waters. And this determination must be
carefully explained in each act. With the three acts discussed in
this Comment, there is a need for Congressional action. For
example, since it is generally conceded that the Death on the
High Seas Act provides the exclusive remedy for wrongful death,
it is suggested that Congress amend this Act to indicate when, if
ever, state law may be applied to provide supplemental damages.
This amendment would be particularly desirable if Congress
disagrees with the Supreme Court's decision in the pending
Rodrigue case, or if that case leaves uncertain the application of
state remedies in cases arising other than on the Outer
Continental Shelf.
As previously illustrated, an employer of a longshoreman or
harbor worker has a potential double liability if he is covered by
82. Id. at 466-67.
83. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
because of the Court's interpretation of the statement "if
recovery . . . through workmen's compensation proceedings may
not validly be provided by State law." Since it appears that the
aim of this Act was to insure that such workers had a remedy,
and not to create a dual remedy, Congress should amend its
jurisdictional declaration by clarifying the extent to which it
desires state remedies to be applied in light of the Davis decision,
and thus eliminate the duality which Calbreck fostered. This
would assure the exclusivity of liability which was the professed
aim of the Act.
Currently, the seaman is precluded from suing for wrongful
death under the common law warranty of seaworthiness only if
the injury occurs in the waters of a state. The warranty can be
used to recover for pain and suffering if the death occurs in state
waters, and as the basis for a cause of action for pain and
suffering and wrongful death if the injury occurs on the high
seas. This exception is the result of the Supreme Court's attempt
to ascertain Congressional intent under the Jones Act. It is
suggested that there is no logical basis for such a distinction, and
that Congress could eliminate this by an amendment to the Jones
Act.
As the Supreme Court has stated, courts with admiralty
jurisdiction exercise more freedom in fashioning rules than other
courts;" although this seems to have been true of the district and
circuit courts, the Supreme Court has hesitated to exercise this
freedom. With each act discussed in this note, there is a need for
the Court to declare which principle, uniformity or recovery,
should govern the determination of when state law may be the
basis for supplemental or alternative remedies. The Supreme
Court now has an opportunity to do so in Rodrigue. If, instead
of deciding the case on the narrow issues presented for
determination, the Court clearly indicates when state survival
actions and actions for supplemental damages may be brought in
death cases arising on the high seas, then some degree of
84. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Shipping Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952).
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certainty, at least as to the application of state remedies under
the Death on the High Seas Act, will be assured.JUDITH

N. KEEP

85. Addendum. On June 9, 1969, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 37 U.S.L.W. 4505 (U.S. June 9, 1969).
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice White declared that the Death on the High Seas
Act did not apply to artificial structures on the Continental Shelf; rather, recovery for
death is under Louisiana law as incorporated by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
Two reasons for this were given: (1) The artificial structure was not maritime in nature
and accidents arising thereon "had no . . . connection with the ordinary stuff of
admiralty ......
(ld. at 4507); (2) Congress did not intend admiralty law to apply to
such structures.
The second ground of the decision is questionable; the first is highly suspect.
However, the least satisfying and most confusing aspect of the decision is the failure of
the Court to clearly define "the stuff" from which admiralty is made.

